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The Incidence and Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation
when Corporate and Noncorporate Firms Produce the Same Good
ABSTRACT
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of Arnold Harberger's
celebrated model of the corporation income tax. While the model has been
enormously useful as an analytical device for studying two sector economies,
its usefulness for understanding the incidence and excess burden of the
corporate income tax remains in question. One difficulty confronting all
empirical analyses of the Harberger Model is how to treat noncorporate
production in primarily corporate sectors and corporate production in
primarily noncorporate sectors. The Harberger Model provides no real guide to
this question since it assumes that one good is produced only by corporations
and the other good is produced only by noncorporate firms. Stated
differently, Harberger models the differential taxation of capital used in the
production of different goods, rather than the taxation of capital used by
corporations per se.
This paper presents a two good model with corporate and noncorporate
production of both goods. The incidence of the corporate tax in our Mutual
Production Model (MPM) can differ markedly from that in the Harberger model.
A hallmark of Harberger's corporate tax incidence formula is its dependence on
differences across sectors in elasticities of substitution between capital and
labor. In contrast, the incidence of the corporate tax in the MPM may fall
100 percent on capital regardless of sector differences in substitution
elasticities.
The difference between the two models in the deadweight loss from
corporate taxation is also stiking. Using the Harberger -Shovendata and
assuming unitary substitution and demand elasticities, the deadweight loss is
over ten times larger in the CES version of the MPM than in the Harberger
Model. Part of the explanation for this difference is that in the Harberger
Model only the difference in the average corporate tax in the two sectors is
distortionary, while the entire tax is distortionary in the MPM. A second
reason for the larger excess burden in the MPM is that the MPM has a very
large, indeed infinite, substitution elasticity in demand between corporate
and noncorporate goods; in contrast, applications of the Harberger Model
assume this elasticity is quite small.
Jane G. Gravelle Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Congressional Research Service NBER
Library of Congress 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, DC Cambridge, MA 02138—1—
This year marks the twenty—fifth anniversary of Arnold Harberger's (1962)
celebrated model of the corporation income tax. The Harberger Model, as it
has come to be called, has been remarkably influential. The model not only
vanquished earlier theoretical analyses, but also shifted the debate from one
of theory to one of the proper measurement of the model's parameters. There
is now a voluminous literature that uses the Harberger Model or extensions of
the Harberger Model to measure the incidence and efficiency costs of corporate
taxation.
One issue confronting all empirical analyses of the Harberger Model is
how to treat noncorporate production in primarily corporate sectors and
corporate production in primarily noncorporate sectors. The Harberger Model
provides no real guide to this question since it assumes that one good is
produced only by corporations and the other good is produced only by
noncorporate firms. Stated differently, Harberger models the differential
taxation of capital used in the production of different goods, rather than the
taxation of capital used by corporations per Se. In empirical work the common
finesse, initiated by Harberger, is to assume that all firms in a sector are
identical and face taxation of capital at a rate equal to the sector's average
rate of capital taxation. This assumption is, unfortunately, far from
innocuous. In treating each sector as consisting of identical firms facing
the same tax rate, Harberger ignores the substitution that can arise between
corporate and noncorporate producers. Moreover, as Ebrill and Hartman
(1982,1983) and Cravelle (1981) point out, the Harberger model cannot be
easily modified to permit noncorporate production of the corporate good. If
there is even a single, equally efficient noncorporate producer of the
corporate good, corporate production will entirely disappear in response to
the imposition of a tax on corporate income.—2—
This paper presents a two good (sector) model with corporate and
noncorporate production of both goods. This mutual production model has three
productive factors: capital, labor, and managerial input (entrepreneurial
input in the case of noncorporate firms). Each agent is free to be a
corporate manager, an entrepreneur, or a worker. While agents are equally
productive as corporate managers or workers, they are not equally productive
as entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, those agents who are most productive as
entrepreneurs will establish their own firms, with the marginal entrepreneur
just indifferent between establishing his own firm and employment as a
corporate manager or worker. Entrepreneurs manage their firms solely by
themselves, and their firms may be quite small. In contrast, corporations
must operate at greater than a minimum scale. This minimum scale requirement
insures that the corporate sector will not disappear in the presence of a
corporate income tax.
The incidence of the corporate tax in the Mutual Production Model (MPM)
can differ markedly from that in the Harberger model. A hallmark of
Harberger's corporate tax incidence formula is its dependence on differences
across sectors in elasticities of substitution between capital and labor. In
contrast, the incidence of the corporate tax in the Mutual Production Model
may fall 100 percent on capital regardless of sector differences in
substitution elasticities. This result holds for a large class of production
functions, including the CES function, if each sector initially has the same
capital shares as well as the same corporate share of output.
While one might expect that the two incidence formulae would, in general,
differ, the implicit suggestion in the Harberger finesse is that the two
formulae will converge as one sector becomes more corporate intensive and the
other less corporate intensive. Such, however, is not the case. The Mutual—3—
Production Model incidence formula converges to something quite different from
that in the Harberger Model. The difference in the two models is further
illustrated by assuming CES production functions and using Harberger's (1966)
and Shoven's (1976) data to calculate pre— and post—tax equilibria. With
these data, there are significant differences in incidence in the MPM and
Harberger Model for a variety of combinations of demand and production
elasticities. For example, assuming elasticities of substitution equal to .5
and a demand elasticity equal to 1, the share of the corporate tax borne by
capital in the Mutual Production Model is 141 percent while it is only 82
percent in the Harberger model.
The difference between the two models in the deadweight loss from
corporate taxation is also stiking. Using the Harberger —Shovendata and
assuming unitary substitution and demand elasticities, the deadweight loss is
over ten times larger in the CES version of the Mutual Production Model than
in the Harberger Model. Much of the explanation for this difference is that
in the Harberger Model only the difference in the average corporate tax in the
two sectors is distortionary, while the entire tax is distortionary in the
Mutual Production Model. Stated differently, if each sector is equally
corporate intensive, the Harberger analysis predicts zero distortion from the
corporate tax, whereas the Mutual Production Model predicts a potentially
significant deadweight loss arising from within sector substitution of
noncorporate for corporate production.
The second reason that dead weight loss is so much greater in the MPM
than in the Harberger Model involves the elasticity of product demand. A
larger elasticity in demand between corporate and noncorporate output appears,
ceteris paribus, to increase the extent of substitution away from corporate—4—
capital and to increase the excess burden. In the MPM the source of excess
burden is primarily within—sector substitution of noncorporate for corporate
capital, whereas the source of excess burden in the Harberger model is
between—sector substitution; in the MPM the within—sector elasticity of demand
for corporate and noncorporate output is infinite. In contrast, the between—
sector elasticity of demand, which plays an important role in determining
excess burden in the Harberger model, is thought to be quite small.
The paper proceeds in the next Section, II, by pointing out the extent of
mutual production in particular industries as well as changes through time in
the extent of mutual production. This section indicates that at the two digit
level of aggregation all goods are mutually produced. On the other hand, at
finer levels of aggregation, there appears, for some goods, to be production
only by firms subject to the corporate tax. For example, there appear to be
no noncorporate manufacturers of televisions. The fact that there is zero
noncorporate production of some goods is not, however, a problem for the MPM.
The minimum requirement of the MPM model is that there be corporate production
of both goods, but not necessarily noncorporate production of both goods.
There appear to be very few goods which are not produced by firms subject to
the corporate tax.
Section III motivates our modeling of the corporate tax as a tax on
capital of large firms which are not owned and operated solely by the same
individual or solely by a small number of individuals. While this is a
multifaceted definition of the base of the corporate tax, such a multifaceted
definition appears to be used in practice. Indeed, Reg 301.7701--2(a)(l) of
the IRS code states "An organization will be taxed as a corporation if its
characteristics are such that it more closely resembles a corporation than a
partnership or trust."—5—
Section IV presents the Mutual Production Model (MPM). Section V
compares the corporate tax incidence formula of the MPM with that of
Harberger. Section VI describes the calculation of no—tax and post—tax
equilibria in the MPM and Harberger models which can be evaluated using the
Harberger —Shovendata. Section VII compares the incidence and excess burden
of corporate taxation in the two models. Section VIII summarizes the paper
and suggests further applications and extensions of the model.
Section II. The Extent of Mutual Production
Table 1 indicates that there has been and continues to be corporate
production in all two digit industries as well as all three digit industries
for which data are available. There is also noncorporate production in
virtually all the two and three digit industries; only four of the 50 two and
three digit industries listed in Table 1 have solely corporate production. In
a large number of industries that Harberger includes in the "corporate
sector", the share of noncorporate output has often been quite large. For
example, the noncorporate share of output in retail apparel was 38.1 percent
in 1957; the 1982 figure is smaller, only 19.6 percent. In retail food,
noncorporate production accounted for almost half of output in 1957; more
recently it has accounted for over one quarter of output.
There has been considerable change over time in many industries in the
corporate share of production. One example is drug stores, whose corporate
share of output rose from 38.4 percent in 1957 to 91.4 percent in 1982. Or
consider agriculture, in which the corporate share of output rose from only
9.2 percent in 1957 to 29.3 percent in 1982. While most industries have
become significantly more corporate, several, including mining and motion
pictures, have become somewhat more noncorporate. These data certainly—6—
suggest a very substantial degree of within industry substitution of corporate
for noncorporate production over the last three decades.
The increase in the corporate share of output since 1957 may, in part,
reflect changes in technology. And undoubtedly a small amount of the increase
reflects doctors, lawyers, and others in the service sector using pensions and
retained earnings to shelter their labor income. But much of the increase in
the corporate share of output may reflect changes in corporate versus
noncorporate tax treatment of capital income. The general shift toward
corporate production coincided with a reduction in the differential taxation
of corporate and noncorporate capital income. Gravelle (1987) calculates
marginal tax rates on corporate and noncorporate source capital income, taking
into account both personal and corporate taxes. She reports that the total
(personal plus corporate) effective tax rate on corporate capital income
exceeded that on noncorporate capital income by .52 in 1957, by .44 in 1962,
by .42 in 1971, by .45 in 1975, by .39 in 1982, by .40 in 1986, and by .32 in
1987.1
Section III. What Capital is Subject to the Corporate Tax?
The Internal Revenue Service's definition of a corporation as an
organization that most closely resembles a corporation becomes a little less
circular when we add the IRS' list of corporate characteristics. These
include (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the
profits, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5)
liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and (6) free
transferability of interests. While these are the corporate characteristics,
firms can have these characteristics and still not be subject to the corporate
tax. An S corporation is a corporation with 35 or fewer shareholders and is—7---
taxed as a partnership. Limited partnerships also fall close to the line with
respect to the corporate income tax. Reg. 301.770l—2(a)(2) says that if the
limited partnership has "more corporate characteristics than noncorporate
characteristics", it will be subject to the corporate tax.
One recent response to the rather vague demarcations between corporate
and noncorporate enterprises has been the creation of master limited
partnerships, some of which have thousands of partners. But it appears,
according to The Wall Street Journal of June 30, 1987, that such enterprises
have become sufficiently "corporate" that Congress may soon declare them
subject to the corporate tax. As Robert McIntyre of Citizens for Tax Justice
told The Journal, "If they (the master limited partnerships) want to play with
the big boys, they ought to pay taxes with them."
One is likely to come away from the preceding two paragraphs with the
sense that defining capital subject to the corporate tax is like trying to
define money, "nobody knows precisely what it is, but they know it when they
see it." In "seeing" capital that should be subject to corporate tax the
government appears to be looking both at the size of the enterprise and the
diversity of ownership. Enterprises that are both very large and have a large
numbers of owners appear to be fair game.
But if the criteria for "corporateness" is size and number of owners, why
don't large firms with multiple owners simply break up into small firms with a
single owner or a small number of owners? The answer is surely that for many
products there are some economies, at least for a range, in operating on a
large scale. Large scale production does not necessarily mean integrated
ownership; i.e., in principal one could imagine different owners of robots,
conveyor belts, etc. in an auto plant assembly line. But in the language of
Grossman and Hart (1986), integrated ownership provides residual rights of—8—
control of physical assets that may be important in settings in which complete
ex—ante contracting is too costly.
But given that some enterprises are large, why should they have more than
a very small number of owners? The answer here appears to involve a number of
factors: diversification of risk, the desire to limit liability, information
costs of becoming fully informed about all the activities of a large
enterprise, and liquidity. These reasons for multiple owners are
interrelated. For example, it may be very difficult for any one owner to
become fully informed about a large firm's activities; but the lack of full
information may make investing in a large firm riskier. The limits on full
information provide investors with a further interest in reducing their
exposure in a particular firm, including limiting their liability.
Granted that many firms are likely to be quite large for technological
reasons and that their size induces multiple owners, how is it that
proprietorships and partnerships that produce the same good, but are typically
small, can compete? Our answer is that there is an offsetting technological
advantage to running an enterprise as a partnership or proprietorship, and
that this advantage involves information and control. Entrepreneurs, with a
major stake in their own firm, will have an incentive to stay better informed
about their firm's behavior and to control more fully their firm's behavior
than will shareholders in large companies. In short, the offsetting advantage
to proprietorships and partnerships is less of a principal—agent problem than
arises in the case of large scale corporations. But this advantage to
proprietorships and partnerships dissipates with size. In other words, there
are decreasing returns in adding additional factors to the entrepreneurial
input.
The Mutual Production Model presented in the next Section is designed to
capture, in an admittedly highly stylized setting, the relative advantages—9—
both of large scale production with multiple owners and the typically smaller
scale production by proprietors and partners. The MPM provides a
technological advantage to more efficient entrepreneurs that permits them to
compete with large corporate firms, but their advantage is subject to
decreasing returns.2 The large corporate firms, on the other hand, have a
technical advantage relative to less efficient entrepreneurs. In order for
the corporate firms to produce, however, they must produce at greater than a
specified minimum scale. Corporate fir+ms will thus coexist with more
efficient entrepreneurships both prior to and after the imposition of a
corporate tax. The difference in corporate and noncorporate technologies is,
however, solely with respect to an efficiency coefficient on managerial
(entrepreneurial) input; the forms of the corporate and noncorporate
production functions within each sector are identical. In particular,
corporate and noncorporate firms within each sector exhibit identical
substitution elasticities.
Section IV. The Mutual Production Model
A. Profit Maximization
Equation (1) presents corporate output in sectorQi' as a function of
the number of managers, Md, the number of workers, Lcl, and the amount of
capital, Ki, in sector 1.Equation (2) is the analogous expression for
sector 2.
(1) H(DiMci,Lc1,Kci) if M1 ￿
( —
o ifMi<M1
(2) c2 G(D2Mc2,Lc2,Kc2) if M2 ￿M2
{ —
0 ifMc2<Mc2—10—
The minimum scale constraints in equations (1) and (2) are specified with
respect to managerial input. The terms and D2 are the respective corporate
managerial efficiency coefficients in industries 1 and 2. The functions
H( ,,) andG( ,,) areassumed to be linear homogeneous and quasi—concave.
Assuming positive production by corporations in both sectors, output per




The production functions expressing output per entrepreneur in the two
sectors are identical, respectively, to those in (3) and (4) except with
respect to the managerial (entrepreneurial) efficiency coefficient. Equations
(5) and (6) express output per entrepreneur in the two sectors for
entrepreneurs with respective efficiency coefficients A and B:
(5) q1(A) =h(A,l1,k1)
(6) q2(B) =g(B,l2,k2)
The symbol n stands for non—corporate.
Each agent in the economy can potentially become an entrepreneur in one
of the two sectors; alternatively, the agent can be a manager or worker.
While all agents are equally productive as managers or workers, as
entrepreneurs their productivity depends on their efficiency coefficients.3
Each agent has a pair of coefficients A and B. The number of agents with the
pair of coefficients A and B is given by the joint density function f(A,B)
times the labor force, L.




(9) cl P1h(D1,lci,kc1) —Wl1
—R(1+r)k1
=W
where P1 is the price of good 1, r is the corporate tax rate, c1 is corporate
profit per manager in sector 1, W is the wage rate, and R is the net return to
capital. Since agents are equally productive as workers or managers, they
must receive the same wage in either occupation; equations (7) and (9) express







Using the fact that the partial derivatives of F( ,,) andG( ,, ) are
homogeneous of degree zero, equations (7) and (8) can be reexpressed as:
(13) 1c1D1m1(W/P1,R(l+r)/P1)
(14) kci =D1n1(W/P1,R(l+r)/P1)—12—
And equations (10) and (11) may be written as:
(15) 1c2D2m2(W/P2,R(1+r)/P2)
(16) kc2D2n2(W/P2,R(1+r)/P2)
Substituting (13) and (14) into (9) indicates that corporate profits per
manager in sector xci' can be written as D1 times a function x1of W,




Since entrepreneurs in sectors 1 and 2 have the same production function
as corporations in their respective sectors, except for the efficiency





Note that these expressions do not include the corporate tax rate, r.
Profits per entrepreneur in sector 1 and 2, ir1(A) and lrn2(B), can be
written using the x1( ,,) andx2( ,,) functionsas:
(21) =Ax1(W,R,P1)
(22) ir2(B)= Bx2(W,R,P2)
B. Choice of Occupation
In deciding whether to be an entrepreneur or to be a worker or manager,
each agent considers the profits he would make as an entrepreneur in either
industry A or B as well as the wage paid to workers and managers. An agent
who is just indifferent between becoming an entrepreneur in industry A and
working as either a manager or a worker satisfies the following:
(23) tni( Ax1(W,R,P1) =D1x1(W,R(l+r),P1)
=W
where A is the efficiency coefficient that would make an agent just
indifferent between the three occupation. The corresponding minimum
efficiency coefficient B is defined by:
(24) Bx2(W,R,P1)D2x2(W,R(l+r),P2)W
Combining (21) with (23) and (22) with (24) implies:
(25) ,r1(A) (A/A)W
(26) 1T2(B) =(B/B)W
Agents who choose to be entrepreneurs in sector 1 must earn profits at
least as large as W, but their profits as entrepreneurs in sector 1 must also—14—
be at least as large as what they can earn as entrepreneurs in sector 2.
Agents who are just indifferent between being entrepreneurs in the two sectors
satisfy:
(27) Tn2 orA/A =B/B
Agents with values of A and B less than A and B, respectively, will be workers
or managers. Those with A >Aand B <AB/Awill be entrepreneurs in sector 1;
Those with B >Band A <BA/Bwill be entrepreneurs in sector 2. The terms A
and B are maximum values of A and B, respectively.
C. General Equilibrium Conditions
The conditions that the supplies of labor and capital equal their




The terms L and K stand for the total supplies of labor and capital.L1
and '-2 are total noncorporate labor demands in sectors 1 and 2, while






The noncorporate demands for capital and labor are given by:—15--
AB/A
(34) L1 =L JJ 11(A)
f(A,B) dAdB
BA/B





(36) K1 =JAJk1(A)f(A,B) dB
BA/B
(37) K2 =L JJ k2(B)
f(A,B) dAdB
B 0
The limits of integration in, for example, equation (34) may be explained in
the following way. For an agent to choose to be an entrepreneur in sector
1, the agent's A must be at least as large as A, and his B must be less than
AB/A. Equation (34) sums the labor demands of all entrepreneurs whose
values of A and B satisfy these conditions. The remaining terms in (28) to be
defined, E1 and E2, stand for number of entrepreneurs in sectors 1 and 2,








Following Harberger, equation (40) specifies that the relative aggregate
demand for the two goods depends only on their relative price:
(40) Q1/Q2V(P1/P2)
The terms Q1 and Q2 are the respective total supplies of goods 1 and 2, i.e.
-AB/A









Finally, equation (43) states that the value of output equals the value of
national income I, which is taken as the model's numeraire.
(43) P1Q1 +P2Q2=I—17—
D. Solving the Model and Comparisons with the Harberger Model
The model's solution can be determined as follows. From equations (23)
and (24) one can write A as a function of W and R and P1 and B as a function
of W and R and P2. These relationships plus (17) through (20) imply that L1,
L2, I<nl, ISi2 as well as E1 and E2 can each be written as functions of W and R
and P1 and P2. Substituting these relationships into equations (28) and (29)
and also using (13) through (16) gives two equations in W, R, Md, Mc2, Pl,
and P2. Substituting using (3) through (6) as well as (13) through (20) into
equations (40) and (43) gives two additional equations in these six variables.
The final two equations needed to solve for these six variables arise from
equating (7) and (9) as well as (10) and (12) and substituting in from (13)
through (16).
The differentials of these last two equations, presented in (44) and
(45), as well as the differentials of (23) and (24), presented in (46) and




(46) A (1—) + — P1
(1—crl—l)
(47) B =(1—2)+ — P2
In the above equations
"
standsfor percentage change. The terms l and
are the respective income shares of capital in sectors 1 and 2 in the pre—tax
equilibrium; and l and a2 are the respective income shares of workers in
corporate sectors 1 and 2 in the pre—tax equilibrium. Note that in the pre——18—
tax equilibrium the income shares of corporate and noncorporate firms within a
sector are identical; in the pre—tax equilibrium each noncorporate firm looks
just like its corporate counterpart except for the scale of its inputs and
production.
Equations (44) and (45) indicate that if each sector's initial income
shares are identical, P1 and P2 will change by the same percentage. This
result is quite different from that in the Harberger model in which the
relative price of the two goods always changes regardless of initial income
shares. Intuitively, since corporations in each sector in the MPM model will
still be producing after the tax is imposed, they will both experience the
same percentage increase in marginal cost (which equals the price of output)
if their initial factor shares are identical. This property that relative
output prices aren't necessarily affected by the corporate tax holds
regardless of the relative corporateness of the two sectors, provided there is
nonzero corporate production in each sector.
Equations (46) and (47) indicate how the minimum efficiency
coefficients A and B respond to changes in factor and output prices when the
corporate tax is imposed. Combining (44) with (46) as well (45) with (47)
indicates that both minimum efficiency coefficients fall in response to the
corporate tax; hence, the tax leads to an increase in the number of
noncorporate firms.
Section V. Corporate Tax Incidence in the Mutual Production Model
A. Capital's Share of the Tax Burden
The Appendix derives the formula, presented in equation (48), for the









In (48) all terms above the line are in the numerator, and all terms below the
line are in the denominator. and r1ij are the elasticities of demand of
factor i in response to a change in the input price of factor j for sectors 1
and 2, respectively. The termis the elasticity of substitution in demand
of good 1 for good 2 in response to a change in the relative price of the two
goods. The term 1 —2is the share of total national income spent on
good 1. Note that the formula is general with respect to the extent of
noncorporate production; i.e., zero noncorporate production in either one or
both industries can be considered simply by specifying that K1 and/or K2 are
zero.
While the incidence formula seems rather formidable, it simplifies
considerably in the case that l In this case the terms involving the
demand elasticity, ,dropout, which is to be expected given (44) and (45)
which indicate that there is no change in the relative price of the two goods
in the case of equal initial shares. Alternatively, a simpler expression





The equalities in (49) hold for the CES family of production functions given
in (50), where is the managerial efficiency coefficient, and Hi' a, b,
and p (i=l,2) are production function parameters. They may hold for other
production functions as well, at least locally.
(50) = +aiLi_Pi+bjKi_Pi]_l/Pi i 1,2







According to (51), as in Harberger's model, if all elasticities are equal, the
burden of the tax falls 100 percent on capital. Alternatively, if the capital
shares are equal and if ai =a2,the incidence will also be 100 percent on
capital. However, unlike Harberger's model, the incidence of the corporate
tax can be 100 percent on capital regardless of the elasticities of
substitution in production. In (51) if l =2'the case of equal capital
shares, and if Kci/K1 =Kc2/K2,the incidence on capital is 100 percent
regardless of the values of and a2.
In the case of equal capital shares, but unequal elasticities of
substitution and unequal corporate intensiveness, the incidence formula,






In (52) K stands for total corporate capital. Note that the incidence on
corporate capital equals the elasticities of substitution in each sector
weighted by each sector's share of corporate capital divided by the
elasticities of substitution weighted by each sector's share of total capital.
In the extreme cases in which ai (a2) equals infinity, the reduction in the
after tax return to capital is the same that would arise if there was only
sector 1 (2).
It may be useful to compare (52) with the corresponding Harberger
incidence formula in the case of equal capital shares. This formula (see




In (53) Ak is capital's share of total national income.
In contrast to the MPM formula (52) in which the incidence can be 100
percent on capital regardless of the values of a1 and a2, in the Harberger
formula (53) the incidence will generally differ from 100 percent in the case
of unequal elasticities of substitution. For example, if =0,capital and
labor are used in fixed proportions in industry 1. Hence, in the Harberger
model taxing capital in industry 1 is equivalent to taxing both factors at the
same rate, and the incidence on capital equals capital's share of national—22—
income, Ak. In the MPM, on the other hand, capital's share of the tax burden
when a 0 is (K2/K)/(K2/K). This term can be greater than 100 percent or
close to zero depending on whether sector 2's share of corporate capital
exceeds or is less than its share of total capital. The same results for the
two models also hold when 02 =. Supposenext that a = or a2 =0.In
this case Harberger's formula predicts that more than 100 percent of the tax
burden will fall on capital. In contrast, capital's share of the tax burden
in the MPM model is (Kci/Kc)/(Ki/K)•
The limiting case in the MPM model when K2 approaches zero and
approaches K1 is particularly instructive. Here the MPM incidence on capital
approaches a1K/(a1K1 +a2K2),which is different from (53), despite the fact
that the economy looks increasingly Harbergian in that virtually all corporate
capital is in sector 1.
While the assumptions given in (49) which lead to (51) are satisfied by a
wide class of functions, there are other quite plausible functional forms that
do not satisfy (49) and imply a different incidence outcome. For example,
equation (54) presents a production function which is Cobb—Douglas between
managerial (entrepreneurial) input and a CES function of labor and capital.
(54) Q1
= + i=l,2
Equation (55) gives the incidence formula in the case of equal capital shares
=2
=) thatresults from assuming that each sector's corporate and
noncorporate production functions are of the form given in (54). This
equation is clearly quite different from equation (52).—23—






B. The Incidence on Workers. Managers, and Entrepreneurs
In the MPM the wage rate is likely to fall even in cases when capital
bears more than 100 percent of the tax. In contrast to workers, managers, and
capital owners, all of whom are likely to be made worse off by the corporate
tax, entrepreneurs who were producing prior to the tax are made better off.
The reason is that in the presence of the tax they become a relatively scarce
factor input; their productive input is equivalent to that of a larger number
of managers, but their productive output is untaxed. In other words, they are
the sine—qua—non of non—taxed noncorporate production.
The formula for the change in the wage rate is determined by combining




(56) W =— (R+r) alL_l)
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Accordingto (56), the wage falls unless the rental rate on capital falls by
more than the increase in the tax rate; i.e., unless the pre—tax cost of
capital falls in the corporate sector. In the CES case with equal capital
income shares the wage unambiguously falls. The formula for this case is
given by:—24—
A A(ci1K1 + a2K2)A
(57)W— r
(l—) (a1K1 +O•2K2)
Using(57), if both sectors are equally corporate intensive, one canshow that
the decline in labor income as a share of tax revenue equals theratio cz/(l—fl)
times the ratio of noncorporate to corporate capital.
Section VI. Calculating No—Tax and Post—Tax Equilibria in the MPMand
Harberger Models
A. Method of Initializing Model
In measuring the incidence and efficiency cost of corporatetaxation in
the MPM model we follow Harberger and Shoven in using observed average
corporate tax rates. We acknowledge that theeffective marginal corporate
income tax may differ from the observed average corporate tax becauseof debt
finance as discussed by Stiglitz (1974) and Gordon and Malkiel (1981).Our
purpose here, however, is not to question Harbergerand Shoven's choice of
data, but simply to illustrate using their data and procedureshow the
predictions of the Mutual Production Model can differfrom those of the
Harberger Model.
We follow Shoven in calculating no—tax and post—tax equilibriarather
than simply evaluating derivative formulae, such as (51); such formulae are
valid only for small tax changes and must be evaluated with data onthe pre-
tax equilibrium which, unfortunately, is unobservable. In calculatingno—tax
and post—tax equilibria we use the CES production function, givenin (50), and
assume the following CES utility function:—25—
(58) U [dQ1 + (l—d)Q2]/7
We also assume that the joint density function, f(A,B), is the product of two
independent exponential functions, exp(—'A) and I'exp(—l'B). The values of the
two parametersand F were chosen to produce the observed post—tax ratios of
corporate to noncorporate capital in each sector. To test the sensitivity of
the results to the choice of this joint density function, we also calculated
no—tax and post—tax equilibria assuming a fixed number of entrepreneurs in
each sector.
The observed post—tax equilibria provides us with parameter values that
are used in computing the no—tax equilibria. We measure factors and goods in
units such that R, W, P1, and P2 equal unity in the post—tax equilibrium. We
also set and D2 equal to unity. These conventions together with
information on factor and output shares, information on average corporate tax
rates in each sector, a specified level of national income, I, the choice of
and 4,,andthe calibrated values of ''andF, permit us to solve
for the values of K and L. Given these parameter values, solving for the no—
tax equilibrium is straightforward.
To make these statements precise, Table 2 lists the equations of the MPM
in the post—tax equilibrium for the case of CES production and utility
functions. In the Table the tax rate t levied on pre—tax capital income is
related to the tax rate r on post—tax capital income according to t=r/(l+r).
We express these formulae in terms of t since the U.S. corporate tax is levied
on pre—tax capital income. The parameters ad and ac2 are the income shares
of workers in the two industries in both corporate and non—corporate firms in
the post—tax equilibrium. While we subscript a here by c, the corporate and
noncorporate post—tax labor shares within a sector are identical. Note also—26—
that the terms here are post—tax shares, whereas the ais used above and in
the Appendix are no—tax shares. The parameters cl and c2 equal the
corporate ratios in industries 1 and 2 of pre—tax capital income to the value
of output.
The parameters and (i=l,2) are related to the underlying CES
production function parameters as well as the tax rate t according to the
formulae: a= a cib1i [H(l_t)]i1i
Given the values of acl,crc2,flcl,8c2,t,d,7,I, p1, and p2 as well as the
parameters, ''aidr, (59) —(76)can readily be solved for the values
of K and L .Oncewe have these total factor supplies we can solve for the
pre—tax equilibrium using the equations listed in Table 3. These equations
correspond to those of Table 2 except that output and factor prices are now
endogenous. In Table 3 there are 16 equations in the 16 unknowns K1, K2,
Kni, I<n2, Lcl, Lc2, Lnl, Ln2, R, W, P1, P2, M, Mc2, A, and B. The two
outputs Q1 and Q2 are not additional unknowns since they can be expressed via
the production functions in terms of the factor inputs.
B. Parameterization of the Model
Table 4 lists the values of the parameters appearing in Tables 3 and 4
that are used in calculating pre— and post—tax equilibria. In the 1957 data
used by Shoven (1976) I is $296 billion, with the capital income share equal
to .60 in the "noncorporate" sector and .20 in the "corporate" sector. In
analyzing the MPM we let sector 1 correspond to the "noncorporate" sector and
sector 2 correspond to the "corporate" sector. The 1957 post—tax share of
total national income of sector 1, 0, equals .15 (Shoven, 1976). The MPM
requires knowledge of the post—tax shares of income paid to workers in the two
sectors, adandac2. Note that for the CES model these shares areidentical—27—
for corporate and noncorporate firms within each sector. The values of
and ac2 were determined using the 1959 proprietorship tax returns which report
labor payments for the industries in the two sectors.4
Determining the values of cl and c2 is a bit more involved. To
calculate the values of cl and c2 we use the following relationships:
(K./K.) + (K
(93) .2. fori =1,2 ci 1
(K./K.) + (K./K.)(l—t)
where stands for the sector i's share of capital income (.60 for sector 1
and .20 for sector 2). This equation simply relates capital's (unobserved)
net of tax income share for corporate firms to the overall pre—tax share of
capital income in the sector (which is observed). Not surprisingly, the
equation involves the corporate and, non—corporate shares of capital in the
sector as well as the tax rate t. It also uses the following relationship
between noncorporate and corporate net of tax capital shares:
•= '' ni'ci
The value of t, the average corporate tax rate, for 1957 is .45 according
to data reported in The Economic Report of the President. l987. To solve for
the post—tax corporate and noncorporate shares of capital within each sector
entering (93), we use the following relationships:








where t is the average corporate tax rate reported in 1957 in sector i. The
specific values determined from Rosenberg's (1969) data are t1 =.014and t2 =
.340.Equation (94) simply exploits the idea that if the tax t is levied only—28—
on corporate firms and one observes the average tax rate t in sector i, where
the average is computed using total sector i capital, one can infer the
corporate share of the sector's capital, i.e., the share of the capital that
is subject to the tax t. The calculated values of Kcl/Kl and Kc2/K2 are .017
and .630, respectively. These values as well as the values for appear in
equation (93) and Table 4's formulae for cl and c2 Note that for a given
value of t, depends on the value of c.
In addition to observing indirectly the ratios of corporate to
noncorporate capital in each sector, we can also indirectly observe each
sector's post—tax share of total capital.6 Taken together, these ratios
determine the post—tax ratios K1/K, and K2/K as well as the ratios
K1/K and K2/K. These four ratios can be used to determine K in the
following manner: the four ratios plus equations (67)—(70) and (73)—(74)
can be substituted using the production function into equation (75)
yielding one equation in the unknown K. Given this value we can determine the
levels of K ,K ,K ,andK .Nextthese capital values can be used
nin2 ci c2
together with equations (67) —(70)and (73)—(74) to determine Lcl Lc2 Mi
M2, Lni and L2. Plugging these six values into equation (66)and using
the formulae (38) and (39) for E1 and E2 yields a single equation in
the remaining unknown parameters L, ,and1'.Equations (71) and (72), given
the values of K and K represent the other two equations needed to solve
ni n2
for these three remaining parameters. Note that these three equations involve
p1 and p2; hence, thevalues of L, 'Z', and r will differ with each choice of
the two elasticities of substitution in production.—29—
Section VII. A Comparison of Tax Incidence and Excess Burden
in the MPM and Harberger Models
A. Tax Incidence
Table 5 presents the share of the tax burden borne by capital for
different combinations of demand and production substitution elasticities for
the MPM CES example and the Harberger Model. For many combinations of
elasticities the incidence in the two models is quite different. For example,
if the demand elasticity is unity and both production elasticities equal .5,
capital bears only 82 percent of the tax burden according to the Harberger
Model, but it bears 141 percent of the tax burden according to the MPM. The
difference in the predicted incidence in this case is over half the total tax.
Capital's share of the tax burden can be both larger and smaller in the
Harberger model compared with the MPM; in the case that the corporate and
noncorporate substitution elasticities are .5 and 2, respectively, and the
demand elasticity is unity, capital's share of the tax burden is 61 percent in
the Harberger model, but only 27 percent in the MPM. Another difference in
the incidence results is that, ceteris paribus, a higher demand elasticity
raises capital's share of the tax burden in the MPM, but lowers capital's
share in the Harberger Model.
The incidence in the MPM is a bit different for some parameters if one
assumes that the number of entrepreneurs is fixed in each sector. For
example, in the case that both corporate and noncorporate substitution
elasticities equal .5 and the demand elasticity equals unity, capital's share
of the tax burden is 131 percent of the revenue (compared with 141 percent in
the case of a variable number of entrepreneurs). Another example is the case
of a unitary demand elasticity and respective corporate and noncorporate
substitution elasticities of 2 and 1.In this case the incidence on capital—30—
is 129 percent of the tax revenue when entrepreneurs are in variable supply,
but 134 percent of revenue when they are in fixed supply.
Table 6 presents the incidence of the corporate tax in the MPM on workers
and managers as a group and on entrepreneurs. The results are very sensitive
to the choice of elasticities. For the case of unitary elasticities the
income of workers and managers falls by 28 percent of the tax revenue in
response to the corporate tax, while the profits of entrepreneursrises by 28
percent. For the case that the corporate and noncorporatesubstitution
elasticities are 1 and 2 respectively, the loss to workers exceeds 60 percent
of the tax revenue, while the gain to entrepreneurs is almost a quarter of tax
revenue. Finally, if the corporate and noncorporate elasticities are2 and
.5, respectively, the income of workers and managers rises by over one third
of revenue, while that of entrepreneurs rises by almost one fifth of revenue.
B. Excess Burden
1. Estimates
Table 7 compares the dead weight loss in the two models. Our excess
burden measure is based on a compensating variation. We determine the amount
of additional income needed in the post—tax equilibrium to regain the no—tax
level of utility. Measuring the distortion based on an equivalent variation,
that determines the amount of pre—tax income that needs to be taken away to
achieve the post—tax utility level, yielded quite similar results.
The excess burden measured as a fraction of tax revenues is more than ten
times larger in the MPM than in the Harberger Model for all elasticity
combinations. For most of the combinations, the dead weight loss in the MPM
model exceeds the tax revenue. Consider the case of unitary production and—31—
demand elasticities. In this case theexcess burden in the Harberger Model is
only 8 percent of revenue, while it is 123percent of revenue in the Mutual
Production Model. Even if all elasticitiesare smaller, for example, .5, the
MPM predicts a sizeable distortion, 129percent of revenue, while the
Harberger Model's predicted distortion is only 4percent of revenue.
The excess burden in the MPM isconsiderably smaller if one assumes that
entrepreneurs are in fixed supply. For example, in the case that all
elasticities are unity, holding fixed the number ofentrepreneurs reduces the
excess burden from 123 percent to 74 percent of revenue. If allelasticities
equal .5, the excess burden is reduced from 129percent of revenue to 66
percent of revenue. But even with the supply ofentrepreneurs fixed, the
excess burden in the MPM is still at least 7 times that in theHarberger
Model.
2. Understanding the Differences in Excess Burden
One reason that the excess burden in the MPM isso much greater than in
the Harberger Model involves the size of thedistortionary tax rates in the
two analyses. Although the MPM results are basedon the same tax data,
including the same tax revenue, the effective distortionarywedge in the MPM
model is 82 percent, while it is only 50percent in the Harberger —Shoven
procedure. Since excess burden roughly rises with thesquare of the tax rate,
the difference in effective distortionarytaxes can, by itself, account for an
MPM excess burden that is 2.6 times theHarberger Model's excess burden.
To understand these differences note that in the MPMmodel the economy—
wide average corporate tax rate, calculatedas total corporate revenues
divided by total corporate income, is .45. In terms of themodel's tax
variable r, this value of .45 for t corresponds toa value of r of .82, since—32—
r =t/(l—t).With such a large distortionary tax, the considerable size of
the distortion in the MPM is not surprising. In contrast, in the Harberger —
Shovenanalysis the distortionary corporate tax is the differencebetween the
average corporate tax rates in the two sectors. Butthis average tax in each
sector is computed based on total sector capital income, not simplythe
corporate income in the sector. By averaging over noncorporate aswell as
corporate capital in determining the tax rates in each sector, Harbergerand
Shoven dilute the effective distortionary corporate tax. Since t1.014 and
=.340,the effective distortionary tax in the Harberger —Shovenprocedure
is only .50, which corresponds to (.340 —.014)/[(1—.340)(l.014)].
The second reason that the excess burden is so much larger in the MPM
than in the Harberger Model involves differences in the two models in the
source of the inefficiency in conjuncture with differences inwithin—sector
and between—sector demand elasticities. To understand this point first note
that the approximation formula for excess burden is the same in both models,
namely .5r23Kc/3r, where stands for total corporate capital. But the
change in corporate capital in the MPM model is due, ultimately, towithin—
sector substitution of noncorporate capital as well as other factorsfor
corporate capital. Indeed, were there no within—sectorsubstitution, i.e.,
were there no noncorporate production either before or afterthe tax, 3K/8r
in the MPM would be zero. In contrast to the MPM, in the Harberger Model
3K/8r is negative because of between—sectorsubstitution of capital.
The fact that the MPM's ultimate source of the inefficiency is within—
sector rather than between—sector changes in capital, does not byitself
suggest that excess burden is larger in the MPM. But oneneeds to consider
these differences in the source of excess burden in light of differences in
the within— versus between—sector elasticities of demands for corporateand—33—
noncorporate goods. In the MPM the within—sector demand elasticity between
corporate and noncorporate output is infinite. In contrast, in both models,
the between—sector demand elasticity between corporate and noncorporate goods
is assumed to be small, typically unity or less. To appreciate how this
difference in demand elasticities may affect the reduction in corporate
capital and, thus, excess burden, consider how excess burden in the Harberger
Model changes as the between—sector demand elasticity increases. Assuming
unitary elasticities of substitution in production, raising the demand
elasticity in the Harberger model from unity to 10 increases the excess burden
by a factor of 3. Together with the 2.6 factor arising from differences in
effective tax wedges, this factor of 3 suggests an excess burden in the MPM
that could easily exceed that in the Harberger Model by a factor of 7.
3.Does the Method of Aggregation Affect the MPM Results?
Harberger allocated U.S. industries to "corporate" and "noncorporate"
sectors based on the size of their average tax. While this was appropriate
for Harberger's purposes, his two sector division is not necessarily the most
appropriate two sector division from the perspective of the MPM. Hence, it is
important to understand how the MPM results would differ if the two sectors
were chosen differently.
If all production functions of the underlying products are locally
identical (all own and cross factor demand elasticities as well as factor
shares are the same for all goods) the method of aggregation affects neither
incidence nor excess burden in the MPM. To see this, consider the general
formula of tax incidence, equation (48). In the case that sector 1 and 2 have
the same technology locally, the incidence on capital is independent of both
the ratio of K1 to K2 and the degree of corporate intensity in the two—34—
sectors. Next consider the triangle approximation formula for excessburden
in the MPM. As in the Harberger Model, this formula is given by .5r2dKc/dr.
Some additional differentiation of the MPM leads to the following formulafor
A A 1 2
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Whensectors 1 and 2 have the same technology locally, the percentage change
in k1 equals the percentage change in k2. Hence, equation (95) indicates
that when the two technologies are locally identical, dX/dr is independent of
the ratio of Knl to Kn2• In this case the MPM's excess burden is the same
regardless of whether one allocates all noncorporate production to one sector
or spreads the noncorporate output between the two sectors.
This last statement may seem surprising in light of the above argument
that it is the infinite within—sector corporate—noncorporate demand elasticity
that explains the large excess burden; how can the MPM excess burden be large
if the within—sector demand elasticity is not relevant for one of the sectors
because the sector is totally corporate? The answer is that in the case of
identical local technologies, all that is needed is one sector in which the
demand elasticity between corporate and noncorporate goods is infinite
provided that sector has all the noncorporate capital.
From equation (95) and some additional calculations with the model it
appears that excess burden in the MPM is larger if onechooses the two sectors—35—
to maximize the difference between capital income shares. In other words,
aggregations which do not maximize the differences between capital income
shares will understate the excess burden. Oddly enough, Harberger's division
of output into two sectors produces two sectors with quite different capital
income shares. Hence, we believe the excess burden reported above for the MPM
would be only slightly larger for other choices of the two sectors with even
more divergent capital income shares. This discussion and our additional
calculations also suggest that disaggregating the MPM into more than two
sectors would also increase the excess burden.—36—
Section VIII Summary and Suggestions for Additional Research
The model developed in this paper exhibits mutual production of each good
by corporate and noncorporate firms. Noncorporate firms arise endogenously;
those individuals who choose to become entrepreneurs are more efficient than
corporate managers, but since their managerial input is fixed,their output is
subject to diminishing returns. In addition, entrepreneurs can only produce
by themselves. Corporate firms have a technological advantage relative to
less efficient entrepreneurs in producing at a large scale. Hence, corporate
firms co—exist with the limited number of more efficient entrepreneurs both
prior to and after the introduction of a corporate income tax, althoughthe
tax induces production by less efficient entrepreneurs. While the efficiency
of their managerial input differs, both corporate and noncorporate firms
within each sector have identical production functions.
In contrast to the mutual production model, Harberger's model of the
corporate tax collapses in the presence of corporate and noncorporate
production of the same good, with the corporate sector disappearing.
Harberger's model is really not a model of a tax on the income of corporations
per Se. Instead of analyzing a tax on the corporate form, Harbergermodels
the differential taxation of capital used in the production of different
goods. The U.S. corporate income tax, however, does not apply differentially
to producers of different commodities, rather it is levied on corporate as
opposed to noncorporate firms. By ignoring noncorporate production in
primarily corporate sectors and corporate production in primarily noncorporate
sectors, Harberger's model ignores the potential substitution of noncorporate
for corporate production within each sector.
This within—sector substitution permits a source of inefficiency not
included in Harberger's formulation, namely the substitution of less efficient—37—
noncorporate production for more efficient corporate production. The within—
sector substitution explains why the deadweight loss from corporate taxation
is many times larger in the Mutual Production Model than in the Harberger
Model. Indeed, the excess burden in the CES illustration of the MPM is
typically larger than the corporate tax revenue.
The within—sector substitution also obviates much of the source of
relative price changes arising in the Harberger model and alters the effects
of sector differences in substitution elasticities. These are the major
reasons why the incidence of the corporate income tax can differ so greatly in
the MPM and Harberger Model. In contrast to the Harberger incidence formula,
demand effects drop out of the MPM incidence formula if both sectors have CES
production functions and also have the same initial shares of capital income.
If, in addition, each sector is equally corporate intensive, the MPM's tax
incidence is 100 percent on capital regardless of differences in substitution
elasticities between the two sectors.
The CES results for 1957, while striking, must be viewed in perspective.
First, we have followed Harberger and Shoven in using average, rather than
effective marginal tax rates in the calculations and in ignoring personal
taxes. Using Cravelle's (1987) estimates of the total (corporate plus
personal) marginal tax wedge would raise our estimate of excess burden for
1957. Parenthetically, Cravelle's estimates indicate a much lower excess
burden for 1987 and a much larger efficiency gain from the 1986 tax reform act
than has previously been suggested. Second, like Harberger and Shoven, we
have ignored depreciation; proper adjustment for depreciation would reduce the
dead weight loss estimates. Third, if marginal—debt equity ratios differ from
average debt—equity ratios, the marginal effective tax wedge would differ from
the average corporate tax rate considered in this paper as well as the total—38—
(personal plus corporate) tax wedge calculated by Gravelle (1987). Forth, the
results might differ if the model were disaggregated, as in Shoven (1976) and
Ballard, et. al (1985), to include many sectors. Fifth, the joint density
function determining entrepreneur's abilities should be estimated empirically.
Sixth, the model could be expanded to treat managerial and entrepreneurial
input, on the one hand, and labor, on the other hand, as distinct production
factors. And seventh, the assumption that corporate and noncorporate
production functions are identical within a sector needs to be tested and
potentially relaxed. These issues provide ample scope for additional
research.
In conclusion, perhaps the best celebration of the 25th anniversary of
Harberger's remarkably influential model would be a rebirth of analytical
attention to the questions of what constitutes a corporation and what
precisely does the corporation income tax tax.—39—
Appendix
The Asymbolrefers below to the percentage change in a variable
All prices initially equal 1.
The differential of the demand equation (40) can be expressed as:
(Al) Q1—Q2
=
whereis the elasticity of substitution between the two products.
The differential of output in industry 1 is:













The change in output in industry 2 can similarly be written as:












We combine (Al), (A2), and (A3) noting that: KciMd +kci
Tcl Mcl+ 1c1 K2 Mc2 +kc2Lc2Mc2+ 1c2' Q1K/ K1, and
















+LdB A dBAdA —
N[l+l(B) +k(B)] f(A,B) +-







We now differentiate (29) and divide by M 1k(i.e., by 1<C1)whichyields; Cici
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The first four terms represent the changes in corporate capital in the
two sectors. The next three terms are the changes in capital for non—
corporate production in industry 1 due, respectively, to changes in capital in
existing firms, changes due to new firms established by former corporate
managers and workers, and by new firms established by entrepreneurs who
previously had firms in industry 2.
We similarly differentiate equation (28) for a fixed stock of labor and
divide by M1l1 (which equals Lcl )
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Tosolve the model, we solve equation (Al.4) for and substitute
into (Al') and into (AS). Then the new equation for (A5) is solved
for c2 The resulting expression for c2 is then substituted into the
final version of (Al'). In the course of this substitution several
of the terms with integrals will cancel out. When equation Al.4 is
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alsoresult in terms canceling out when the new (Al.5) is substituted into
(Al').
The only integrals which do not cancel out through this process are
those relating to the switching of existing entrepreneurs from one industry
to another. These terms, which are each multiplied by
1 1 1 +] [(1+1)k —(1+1 )k]
, aregiven by:
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The same reasoning will—45—
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Note, however, that if we bring c2 with the first term inside the
integral it becomes l2B which is 1n2' and if we bring k2 in the second
term into the integral it becomes k2B which is k2(B)B. Thus these parts of
the integral will cancel, and similarly, parts of the second two terms will
will cancel. Moreover, since the number of entrepreneurs switching must net
to zero, the term with l's cancel.






























By using the relationship A =—s--B,which holds along the path of
integration, these terms also cancel.
We note that
(1+1)k—(1+1)k
which appears in the final equation
cl c2 c2 cl
is equal to 1)q1q2, where the q terms stand for output per corporate
manager. The terms and n2' etc. refer to changes in non—corporate
capital and refer to the solution to the integrals which reflect changes in
capital and labor of existing noncorporate firms. The final equation is:
(Al'')
Kn1n1] [1_fl1) +(Kc2c2+Kn2fl2) [i_s2)
A A A A 1l2 A A
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We now substitute into (Al.l") from equations (A1.6). In this
substitution we use the facts that (i/i)Eir=6kw and 2'21r kw
(A6)
=iw
—+ ir+r — P1)
cl =Icw
















k2 'icw —+ 'kr—
Theincidence formula (48) results from the above substitution and
the relationships (Al.7) —(A1.ll)given below:
(A7) =0 ,whichis the result of differentiating (43).
(A8) =- ______
Den.








In (A8) —(All)the term Den =O1(l_8l)+O2(12).
For the CES function given in (50) it is easy to show that the factor
demands for capital per manager and labor per manager satisfy:
A A A A A
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In the case of the Cobb Douglas/CES function capital per manager and labor
per manager satisfy for i =1,2:
A A A A A A A A
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Table 1:




"NON—CORPORATE" 6.2 20.4 227.3
Agriculture 9.2 29.3 219.7
Production 9.6 22.8 136.5
Services 4.0 62.4 1463.3
Housing 1.3 2.4 25.0
Crude Oil & Gas 74.7 84.8 13.6
"CORPORATE" 75.8 86.4 13.9
Mining 87.2 84.4 —3.3
Construction 55.8 73.1 31.0
Manufacturing 95 .8 97 .6 1 .9
Food 93.9 97.8 4.1
Tobacco 100.0 100.0 0.0
Textiles 97.0 99.0 2.1
Apparel 85.7 94.3 10.0
Lumber, wood 70.8 85.0 19.9
Furniture 90.5 97.1 7.3
Paper 100.0 100.0 0.0
Printing 89.3 89.3 0.0
Chemicals 98.6 97.4 —1.3
Petroleum 100.0 100.0 0.0
Rubber 100.0 100,0 0.0
Leather 96.9 98.6 1.8
Stone,Clay & Glass 92.3 96.8 4.9
Primary Metals 98.6 97.3 —1.3
Fabricated Metals 94.7 97.8 3.2
Machinery 96.5 98.1 1.6
Electronics 99.1 99.5 0.5
Transportation Equipment 99.5 98.7 —0.9
Other 89.7 88.4 —1.5
Transportation, Communication,
and Public Utilities 92.1 92.3 2.0
Transportation 86.0 81.7 —0.4
Communication, Utilities 99.0 98.8 —0.3
Trade 62.7 82.9 32.3
Wholesale 76.2 91.7 20.5
Retail 52.6 74.5 41.6
Food 52.8 75.5 43.1
General Merchandise 84.6 96.9 14.5
Apparel 61.9 80.4 29.9
Furniture 46.5 68.0 46.3
Auto, Gasoline 50.9 70.7 39.0
Drug Stores 38.4 91.4 138.0
Eating & Drinking Places 28.5 59.0 106.8
Building Materials, Hardware 51.0 75.5 47.9—50—
Table 1 (cont'd)





Other 38.8 62.9 62.3
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 60.4 74.1 22.8
Securities Dealers 13.2 24.5 85.1
Other Finance 90.5 80.9 —10.6
Insurance 80.7 94.7 17.5
Real Estate 34.0 36.8 8.2
Services 38.4 61.1 59.2
Hotels 52.6 59.2 12.6
Personal Services 34.6 47.6 37.7
Business Services 62.1 67.9 9.4
Auto Repair 32.6 54.9 68.1
Other Repair 33.8 50.3 49.0
Amusements 68.2 73.5 7.8
Motion Pictures 89.6 79.5 —11.3
Other 47.0 70.3 49.7
Other Services 9.0 53.6 498.4
Source: Output Shares for Housing are based on estimates of net stocks of
residential capital. ("Fixed Capital Stock in the United States: Revised
Estimates, 1925—1979," and "Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United
States, 1980—83", both by John C. Musgrave, Survey of Current Business,
Department of Commerce, February 1981 and August 1984 respectively). Output
shares for all other industries are taken from business receipts reported in
Department of the Treasury, Statistics of Income, U.S. Business Tax Returns:
1957—1958. Partnership Returns. 1978—82), Corporation Income Tax Returns.
1982; "Sole Proprietorship Returns, 1982", SOI Bulletin, Summer 1984.
Agricultural business receipts for proprietorships, which is no longer
included in the proprietorship returns, is reported for 1982 in "Sole
Proprietorship Returns, 1984, SOl Bulletin, Summer 1986, footnote 4, p. 23.
Data on Subchapter S corporations for 1982 is reported only by major
industrial division. These receipts were allocated among subcategories based
on the distribution of non—corporate output. The Table double counts the
leasing of residential structures; leasing of residential structures is


































Table 3. Equations of No—Tax Equilibrium
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Table 4.Parameter Values for the Mutual Production and Harberger Models
a1 .5, .75, 1, 2 L (Described in Text)
C2.5,.75, 1, 2 K$59.5 billion
9=.15
ai =.19 f(A,B) =rexp—(A-1-rB)
ac2 .57 ,I'(described in text)
—.60[.017 + .983(l_t)C1] c1 —.017+ .983(1—t)
—.20[.630 + .37O(l_t)C2] c2 — .630+ .370(1—t)
t =.45
I =$296billion (j )l/(1+•Y) =
y=lq .=l—cJ (i=l,2)—55—
Table 5
Comparison of the Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax
in the MPM and Harberger Models
Share of Tax Burden Falling on Capital
Elasticity of Substitution (by Demand Elasticity)
in Production
Mutual Production ModelHarberger Model
Corporate"Noncorporate" .5 4 1 =.5 1
1 1 .94 1.00 1.08 1.00
2 2 1.02 1.03 1.15 1.12
.75 .75 1.00 1.10 1.04 .93
.50 .50 1.23 1.41 .97 .82
1 2 .60 .63 .93 .87
1 .75 1.11 1.20 1.13 1.04
1 .50 1.37 1.47 1.19 1.08
2 1 1.26 1.29 1.27 1.22
.75 1 .79 .88 .99 .89
.50 1 .58 .71 .84 .73
2 .50 1.53 1.57 1.34 1.27
.50 2 .21 .27 .68 .61—56—
Table 6
Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax on Workers and Managers and on
















Incidence as Share of





























Comparison of the Excess Burden of the Corporate Income Tax
















Excess Burden Divided by Tax Revenue
(by Demand Elasticity)




























1. These tax rates represent marginal effective (personal plus corporate) tax
rates on new investment. For the corporate sector the return after all taxes
to stockholders and creditors is grossed up by personal taxes on dividends,
interest, and capital gains (adjusted for the value of capital gains deferral
and the taxation of the inflationary component of capital gains). The
marginal tax rate methodology (see Gravelle, 1982) uses a discounted cash flow
method to determine the pre—tax real return necessary to pay stockholders and
creditors the after—tax return. A similar process is used to measure the non—
corporate pre—tax return required to yield the same after—tax return. The
differential between these two pre—tax returns is used to measure the
corporate—noncorporate tax wedge. This wedge is given by 1 —
wherep is the total effective tax rate on corporate capital, and t is the
total effective tax rate on noncorporate capital.
2. Williamson (1967) and Calvo and Wellisz (1978) present models explaining
the possible limits of entrepreneurial supervision and the attendant loss of
control.
3. After developing our model we became aware of Lucas' (1978) paper that also
models entrepreneurs as managers with differing abilities, but demonstrates
how such a model can explain secular changes in firm size. Chamley (1983) is
another example of an early analysis of differing entrepreneurial abilities
and the choice of occupation.
4. Harberger and Shoven measure capital income as the sum of interest,
profits, rents, and property taxes. These items, except for property taxes,
appear on the proprietorship tax returns. Property taxes were inputed based
on their fraction of capital income as reported in Rosenberg (1969). Labor
payments as a share of total factor income were weighted by industry. Lessors
of real estate were used to determine values for housing. For this industry
there appears to be an error in the 1959 data (the first year for which the
necessary detail is available). For this reason the ratio of labor income to
total factor income for the next available year, 1962, was used.
5. The revenue base for measuring this tax rate is corporate profits plus
interest. Note that the .45 tax rate, which does not consider personal
taxation, is smaller than the .52 tax rate cited in Section II which
corresponds to the 1957 differential tax on corporate versus noncorporate
capital income taking into account both personal and corporate taxation.
Hence, considering personal taxes would increase the estimates of excess
burden in the MPM reported in Section VII.
6. K1/K2 —0111(l—t1)/92l2(l—t2)—59--.
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